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Constitutional Law, Civil Rights. Doe v. Brown University,
253 A.3d 389 (R.I. 2021). The antidiscrimination clause in Article
I, Section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution is not self-executing
under the framework established in Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580
(R.I. 1998), and thus does not establish a cause of action to challenge on-campus sex discrimination. In cases of on-campus assault,
the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act does not establish a cause of action where the victim is a non-student and there is no evidence of
intentional interference with an educational contract. Where such
claims are brought by a non-student and are predicated on previously dismissed Title IX violations, issue preclusion applies.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On November 21, 2013, Jane Doe, who was a freshman at Providence College, was drugged at an off-campus bar, transported to
Brown University, and sexually assaulted by three Brown University students.1 She reported the assault to the Providence Police
Department and Brown University on February 3, 2014,2 and
search warrants of the students’ phones were executed between
February and May of that year.3 On June 19, 2014, Brown notified
Doe that she could file a complaint under the University’s Code of
Student Conduct.4
The school initiated an inquiry on September 5, 2014; shortly
thereafter, Doe requested that the school pursue action under Title
IX.5 Brown declined to do so on the grounds that they had no formal
Title IX policy in place; at the time, sex assault complaints were

1. Doe v. Brown University, 253 A.3d 389, 392–93 (R.I. 2021).
2. Id. at 393.
3. Id. These searches revealed incriminating text messages dated the day
after the assault: “YO LIKE CLASSIC [Student C] THO . . . NO INVITE JUST
WALKS IN AND STARTS RAPING HER,” and “LMAO I died in her face, too
real[.]” Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
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adjudicated under the Code of Student Conduct.6 On October 11,
2014, Doe filed a complaint with the United States Department of
Education against Brown on the grounds that Brown had failed to
redress her Title IX complaint and had not provided a “prompt, equitable, and effective response to plaintiff’s sexual assault.”7
Shortly after Doe filed her administrative complaint, Brown
notified her that it planned to issue charge letters, then took no
further action for a year and a half.8 When Doe inquired as to the
status of the investigation on April 20, 2016, Brown informed her
that it had abandoned its investigation and had pursued no disciplinary action.9 Doe subsequently filed two lawsuits against
Brown: a federal action filed on November 14, 2016, alleging violations of Title IX, the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA), and
Article I, Section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution (Article I, Section 2); and a state action, filed in Rhode Island Superior Court on
September 28, 2017, which addressed the RICRA and Article I, Section 2 claims only.10 In both cases, Doe alleged that Brown’s failure
to investigate the claim interfered with her education at Providence
College, caused her to fear harassment, and ultimately caused her
to withdraw from school.11
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island dismissed the federal claims on September 6, 2017, holding
that, as a non-student, Doe could not pursue a private cause of action under Title IX for an on-campus sexual assault.12 The district
6. Doe, 253 A.3d at 393; see also Brief of Defendants-Appellees at *5, Doe
v. Brown University, 253 A.3d 389 (R.I. 2021) (No. SU-2019-0167-A), 2020 WL
12574285 (noting that during the 2013–14 academic year, Brown’s sexual misconduct policies were governed by the university’s Code of Student Conduct).
7. See Doe, 253 A.3d at 393.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 393-94.
10. Id. See also Doe v. Brown University, 270 F. Supp. 3d 556, 558–59
(D.R.I. 2017) (Doe I).
11. Doe I, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 559 (plaintiff alleged that Brown’s inaction
resulted in “substantial interference with [plaintiff’s] access to educational opportunities or benefits” under Title IX); Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at *24, Doe
v. Brown University, 253 A.3d 389 (R.I. 2021) (No. SU-2019-0167-A), 2019 WL
13092471 (plaintiff alleged that Brown’s inaction “interfered with Doe’s contractual relationship with Providence College, which is prohibited by
[RICRA].”).
12. Doe I, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 564. Judge McConnell noted that Doe had
filed the lawsuit seeking to expand the scope of the statute to include nonstudents but held that this was not permitted under Title IX. Id. at 558.
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court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and the state
claims were dismissed without prejudice.13 The United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the dismissal, holding
that a private cause of action might exist for non-students but was
not available to Doe as she had not alleged that she was “participat[ing] in any of Brown’s educational programs or activities” as
required under Title IX.14
After Doe refiled her claims in Rhode Island Superior Court,
Brown filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it had no control over
the “hostile education environment” and thus could not have interfered with her educational contract at Providence College (a key
claim under RICRA).15 Brown further argued that issue preclusion
barred consideration of the RICRA claim because it relied on the
Title IX claim, which had been dismissed by the District Court and
the First Circuit.16 Finally, Brown argued that the Rhode Island
Constitution did not create a private cause of action for damages for
sex discrimination, and that even if it did, it would be inapplicable
as Brown University was not a state actor.17
On February 22, 2019, the Rhode Island Superior Court held
in favor of Brown, dismissing the RICRA claims on the grounds of
issue preclusion and dismissing the Article I, Section 2 claim on the
grounds that the Rhode Island Constitution did not create a private
cause of action for damages.18 Doe appealed on February 25, 2019,
arguing error on both counts.19 The Rhode Island Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court rulings on all counts.20
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

This case involved two issues of first impression: the question
of how RICRA applied to on-campus sexual assaults of non-students, and the question of whether the nondiscrimination clause of

13. Id. at 563 (noting that the RICRA claim “raise[d] substantial question[s] of state law that are best resolved in state court”) (citations omitted).
14. Doe v. Brown University, 896 F.3d 127, 131–33 (1st Cir. 2018) (Doe II).
15. Doe, 253 A.3d at 394.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 394–95.
20. Id. at 401.
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the Rhode Island Constitution included a private cause of action.21
Another key issue, relevant both to issue preclusion and to Doe’s
interference with contract claim, was the general scope of RICRA:
whether the statute provided a cause of action that was broader
than Title IX, or whether it was intended to closely mirror the federal statute.22
Doe argued for a broad interpretation, contending that the Superior Court erred in holding that the RICRA claim was precluded
by the Title IX claim and also in holding that Article I, Section 2
provided no private right of action.23 Brown argued, in response,
that RICRA does not provide a cause of action that is broader than
Title IX, that the RICRA claim was precluded by prior holdings,
that the Rhode Island Constitution provided no private cause of action, and that if it did, it would not apply to Brown as the University
was not a state actor.24
The Court addressed three issues in turn: first, whether the
RICRA claim was properly barred under issue preclusion; second,
whether RICRA’s antidiscrimination protections regarding the
right to “make and enforce contracts” could be interpreted broadly
to sanction “a university’s failure to reasonably prevent, respond to,
and remedy known acts of sex discrimination . . . on its campus, by
its students”; and third, whether the nondiscrimination clause of
Article I, Section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution created a private right of action.25
21. Id. at 396, 398–99.
22. Id. at 396. In the Appellant’s Brief, Doe argued that RICRA provides
a broader cause of action than Title IX because it is not limited to pleading
discriminatory conduct in a university’s “programs or activities.” Brief of
Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 11, at *19. A supporting amicus brief noted
that “[RICRA] specifically states that ‘all persons within the state [have] the
same rights . . . to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings,’” emphasizing that this language is broadly inclusive and not limited to sub-classes
of plaintiffs. Brief for Allies Reaching for Equality et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at *2, Doe v. Brown University, 253 A.3d 389 (R.I.
2021) (No. SU-2019-0167-A), 2020 WL 12574286. Brown argued, in response,
that “RICRA is intended ‘to mirror the federal cause of action provided in [42
U.S.C.] § 1981,’” and that it would be a “gross oversimplification” to widen
RICRA’s scope beyond what is strictly outlined in its federal counterpart. Brief
of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 6, at *23.
23. See Doe, 253 A.3d at 395.
24. Id. at 395–96.
25. Id. at 396–401. As a preliminary matter, the Court also noted that
under Rhode Island law, a court is permitted to take notice of judicial records
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A. Claims under RICRA: Title IX and Intentional Interference
with Contract
Under RICRA, “[a]ll persons within the state, regardless of
race, color, religion, sex, disability, age, or country of ancestral
origin, have, except as is otherwise provided or permitted by law,
the same rights to make and enforce contracts.”26 To establish the
elements of a RICRA claim, the Court looked to 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
which indicates that where a plaintiff is alleging discrimination under an analogous federal statute, they must show that (1) they are
a member of a protected class; (2) the defendant discriminated on
the basis of the protected class; and (3) the discrimination implicates an activity listed in the statute.27
Doe alleged two types of intentional discrimination under
RICRA: first, that Brown had “a widespread policy of mishandling
sexual assault on campus, which constituted an official policy of sex
discrimination that increased the risk of sexual assault” (the Title
IX claim).28 Second, she alleged that Brown’s delayed response was
“unreasonable in light of the circumstances,” and that by failing to
investigate such claims, Brown had violated RICRA by interfering
with her education at Providence College (intentional interference
with contract claim).29
The Court began by outlining the standard for issue preclusion
in Rhode Island. Except where the “application of the doctrine
would lead to inequitable results,” issue preclusion applies where
(1) the parties are the same or in privity with the parties of the
previous proceeding; (2) a final judgment has been entered on the
merits in the previous proceeding; and (3) the issue or issues in

when considering a motion to dismiss, including “judgments previously entered by the court that have the effect of res judicata pleadings.” Id. at 395
(quoting Goodrow v. Bank of Am., N.A., 184 A.3d 1121, 1126 (R.I. 2018)). As
such, the Superior Court was not in error by considering plaintiff’s federal district court complaint or the orders dismissing these claims. See id.
26. Id. at 396. See also R.I. GEN. LAWS. ANN. § 42-112-1 (West 2021).
27. Doe, 253 A.3d at 396 (citing Hammond v. Kmart Corp., 733 F.3d 360,
362 (1st Cir. 2013)).
28. Id.
29. Id.
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question are identical.30 The Court found that the RICRA claim
was “predicated upon defendants’ alleged violations of Title IX,”
and that Doe had relied heavily on Title IX even though the federal
court held it did not apply to non-students.31 Because the district
court indisputably held that the plaintiff was not entitled to Title
IX protection, and because the resolution of this issue was “essential to the judgment on the merits” on the Title IX claim, the Court
held that the RICRA claim had been properly precluded.32
Having discussed the Title IX issues, the Court then examined
whether Brown interfered with Doe’s educational contract at Providence College in violation of RICRA.33 As this was an issue of first
impression, the Court drew on examples from employment caselaw
in examining whether there was a prima facie claim for intentional
interference with contract.34 “[T]he aggrieved party must demonstrate (1) the existence of a contract; (2) the alleged wrongdoer’s
knowledge of the contract; (3) his or her intentional interference;
and (4) damages resulting therefrom.”35 The Court held that although Brown was certainly aware that the plaintiff had an educational contract with Providence College, its actions were too attenuated to show intentional interference as a matter of law.36
B. Claim under Article I, Section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution
The bulk of the opinion focused on the third claim: whether the
nondiscrimination clause of Article I, Section 2 of the Rhode Island
Constitution established a private right of action to address discrimination in the absence of enabling legislation.37 The clause
states, “No otherwise qualified person shall, solely by reason of
30. Id. (quoting Foster-Glocester Reg’l Sch. Comm. v. Bd. of Review, 854
A.2d 1008, 1014 (R.I. 2004)).
31. Id. at 397.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 397–98.
34. Id. at 398.
35. Id. (quoting John Rocchio Corp. v. Pare Eng’g Corp., 201 A.3d 316, 324
(R.I. 2019)).
36. Id. This mirrored the reasoning of the district court, which observed
that Brown could not have interfered with Doe’s education at Providence College as Brown had no control over the educational programs at that school. See
Doe I, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 562.
37. Doe, 253 A.3d at 398–401.
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race, gender, or handicap, be subject to discrimination by the
state.”38 Doe argued that the clause should be construed to create
a private right of action, and that because Brown did substantial
business with Rhode Island, the clause should apply.39 As noted
above, this was an issue of first impression.40 It was a key issue,
as in the absence of a constitutional claim, only RICRA clearly established a cause of action for Doe to pursue.41
Bandoni v. State is the seminal case that addressed whether a
provision of the Rhode Island State Constitution includes an implied cause of action.42 Examining Article I, Section 23, the victims’
rights amendment, the Court in Bandoni held that a private cause
of action only exists where a provision is self-executing, i.e., “if it
supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right may be enjoyed and protected, or the duty imposed may be enforced.”43 The
Court cautioned that “principles of judicial restraint prevent us
from creating a cause of action for damages in all but the most extreme circumstances.”44
In Bandoni, the Court laid out a four-part framework to determine when a constitutional provision is self-executing (i.e., where
an implied cause of action would exist):
First, a self-executing provision should do more than express only general principles; it may describe the right in
detail, including the means for its enjoyment and protection. . . . Second, ordinarily a self-executing provision does
not contain a directive to the legislature for further action.
. . . Third, the legislative history may be particularly informative as to the provision’s intended operation. . . . Finally, a decision for or against self-execution must harmonize with the scheme of rights established in the
constitution as a whole.45

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
1998)).
43.
44.
45.

R.I. CONST., art. 1, § 2.
Doe, 253 A.3d at 398.
Id. at 399.
See R.I. GEN. LAWS. ANN. § 42-112-2 (West 2021).
See Doe, 253 A.3d at 399 (quoting Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580 (R.I.
Id. (quoting Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 587).
Id. (quoting Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 595).
Id. at 400 (citing Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 587).
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Applying this standard to the nondiscrimination clause, the
Court held that Article I, Section 2 articulates general principles
only and “does not set forth rules that give those principles the force
of law.”46 The Court held that mandatory language (“shall”) was
not dispositive, and that in the absence of specific rules or any language indicating an action for damages, no cause of action was created.47 Although the nondiscrimination clause did not include any
legislative directives, the Court held that this was to be expected
given its general nature.48
The Court then considered the legislative history, noting that
“[t]he intent of the resolution[, including the antidiscrimination
clause in this section,] was to include the due process and equal
protection language of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
in the Rhode Island Constitution.”49 The Court also noted that the
legislative history was inconclusive, and that “the delegates never
indicated that the resolution would create a private cause of action
for damages; rather they spoke in terms of ‘clear guidance’ and ‘enduring affirmation[s].’”50
Finally, the Court considered whether finding a cause of action
would “harmonize with the scheme of rights established in our constitution as a whole.”51 The Court held that it would not: the violation of a constitutional right does not, on its own, create a cause of
action for damages,52 and the Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that “[t]he judiciary may not properly create a new cause of action
in order to deal with a particular perceive wrong.”53 Citing principles of judicial restraint, the Court held that “the function of adjusting remedies to rights is a legislative responsibility rather than a
judicial task.”54 As such, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s
ruling, holding that the antidiscrimination clause was not self46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 399 (quoting L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council of Cumberland,
698 A.2d 202, 218 (R.I. 1997)).
50. Id. at 400 (quoting Proceedings at Hearing re: R.I. Const. Convention
(June 5, 1986) at 156).
51. Id. at 400 (quoting Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 587 (R.I. 1998)).
52. Id. at 401.
53. Id. (quoting Cullen v. Lincoln Town Council, 960 A.2d 246, 249 (R.I.
2008)).
54. Id. (quoting Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 596).
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executing and that Article I, Section 2 did not give rise to a private
cause of action for damages in the absence of a statutory remedy.55
COMMENTARY

This case reflects long-standing principles of judicial restraint
and a general unwillingness of the Supreme Court to establish new
causes of action in the absence of clear statutory language. In declining to extend RICRA or establish a cause of action under Article
I, Section 2, the Supreme Court’s holding significantly limits the
remedies available to victims of sex discrimination in Rhode Island
in cases where Title IX does not apply. It also reiterates the extent
to which the Court maintains strict deference to the legislature
when asked to weigh in on policy matters.
Under the Bandoni test, Article I, Section 2 provides clear guidance as to the scope of Rhode Island’s antidiscrimination law but no
clear path to a remedy. The Court was largely silent as to the question of RICRA’s scope, although the broader emphasis on judicial
restraint suggests that the statute will be read narrowly going forward. This holding conclusively limits recovery under state law for
off-campus victims of sexual assault, and the legislature may want
to consider extending these provisions to address the current limitations on recovery for this class of plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the nondiscrimination clause of Article I, Section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution
does not establish an independent cause of action for challenging
sex discrimination where a university fails to police on-campus sex
assault, holding that under principles of judicial restraint, constitutional remedies are best set by the legislature. The Court declined to extend the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act to include sex
discrimination claims raised by a non-student against a university,
holding that the statute does not apply where there is no intentional interference with contract and where the issue is precluded
under Title IX.
Katie Gradowski

55. Id.

